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\ Abstract 
This lecture (delivered in French at the Workshop) presents a synthes~ 
highlights of a seminar on informal financial markets held in Washington, D.C., in 
October 1989. 
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INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AFRICA: 
MAIN ISSUES AND SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
by 
Carlos E. Cuevas' 
INTRODUCTION 
This presentation attempts to provide the participants in this workshop with a 
synthesis and highlights of a recent seminar on informal financial markets held in 
Washington, D.C., under the sponsorship of The Ohio State University, the Agency for 
International Development of the United States and the World Bank1• The seminar 
brought together individuals doing research on informal finance around the world who 
reported their most recent findings, and succeeded in establishing priorities for future 
research in this area. 
The major objective of that seminar was to discuss and explain the apparent 
success of informal finance in servicing the poor, alongside the generalized failure and 
serious limitations shown by formal financial institutions when trying to do the same. 
Some of the questions addressed by the participants in the seminar were: 
- Why is it that specialized agricultural banks (e.g., the CNCAs of many West 
African countries) hold asset portfolios dominated by overdue loans, while informal 
lenders and merchants operating at the village level manage to recover practically 
all loans granted?, 
- why is it possible to observe formal financial institutions unable to effectively 
mobilize deposits, while in the same environment informal savings groups inter-
mediate large amounts of funds? 
In Africa, an additional element highlighting the importance and potential of 
informal financial markets needs to be pointed out: of particular relevance here is the 
overall under-development of the formal (institutional) financial system. Countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are at a great disadvantage with respect to other third-world countries 
in terms of the state of the development of their financial institutions. While developing 
economies in Latin America and Asia show bank density ratios of 8 to 30 thousand 
inhabitants per bank branch, typical ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa are in the order of 100 
· Participation in this workshop was funded by the Economic Development Institute 
of the World Bank. Views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author 
and should not be attributed to the World· Bank or its affiliated organizations. 
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to 420 thousand inhabitants per bank branch2• Hence, access to formal financial services 
by the general population is extremely limited in the continent and/or is obtained at very 
high transaction costs. 
The foregoing limitation is accentuated in rural areas, given the urban bias of 
existing bank networks, and the usually poor conditions of communications, rural infra-
structure and transportation in African countries. Macroeconomic constraints and fi-
nancial regulations often compound these limitations making it infeasible for established 
banks to directly provide financial services to rural households and enterprises. The 
potential role for informal financial intermediation in Africa appears, therefore, even 
more clear here than in other developing areas of the world. In what follows, I will 
attempt to summarize the major recent findings of research on informal finance and 
present a few case studies in African countries which illustrate the importance and 
potential of informal financial intermediation in the continent. 
MAIN ISSUES AND RECENT FINDINGS IN INFORMAL FINANCE 
The numerous papers presented at the Washington Seminar covered several key 
issues in informal finance and, in doing so, challenged a number of traditional views and 
stereotypes associated with informal financial intermediation3• 
Diversity of Informal Financial Intermediaries 
First of all, it has become clear that informal financial intermediation is not a 
closed profession or occupation practiced and dominated by usurious and exploitative 
individuals. As Professor Dale Adams of Ohio State points out, "too many discussions 
of informal lending include racial and ethnic undertones reflecting the dark side of 
human nature'14 alluding to the common association of usury with particular ethnic groups 
(Jews, Chinese, Middle-Easterners) in different parts of the world (Europe, East Asia. 
Africa, Latin America). Certainly, there is a number of individual forms of informal 
financial intermediation, but only a small proportion of them could be considered full-
time professional moneylenders5• Furthermore, it appears that the financial activity of 
informal groups is significantly more important in terms of people involved and funds 
mobilized than that of individual intermediaries. 
Individual Financial Intermediaries6 
Full-time moneylenders, pawnbrokers and landlords acting as informal lenders are 
relatively more common in Asia and Latin America than they are in Africa. Traders 
(merchants), money-keepers, relatives and friends appear to be predominant among indi-
vidual financial intermediaries in Africa. 
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Moneylenders typically extend short-term, unsecured loans to well-known clients. 
They tend to operate in localized markets, charging high interest rates relative to other 
lenders while imposing low transaction costs on their borrowers. 
Pawnbrokers, fairly common in Asia, make small loans secured by collateral 
physically deposited with the lender. Thus, their need for information regarding the 
borrower is minimal. The value of the pawned items is normally higher than the loan 
amount, hence, in case of default, the pawnbroker still realizes a net revenue from the 
sale of the items. 
Given the particular nature of land tenancy and land property rights in Africa, 
loans from typical "landowners" to "tenants" are rather uncommon. However, the 
temporary transfer of usufruct rights over land or plantations to a lender has been 
documented in several African countries1• 
Relatives and friends are probably the most common source of informal finance 
in Africa and elsewhere. Loans among relatives and friends are typically based on 
reciprocity, rather than on conventional financial conditions such as interest or collateral. 
Moreover, sometimes even regardless of repayment performance, these loans are con-
sidered an obligation in the extended-family structures of many cultures. 
Merchants engaging in lending as secondary activity typically extend loans linked 
to the sale or purchase of commodities (inputs, consumer goods, farm products). Interest 
charges in these financial transactions are usually disguised under the form of price 
markups (or "markdowns") on the commodity traded. 
Finally, money-keepers appear to be a widespread form of financial intermediation 
in African countries, as well as in other parts of the world. Security is the major reason 
for depositing funds with money-keepers, who normally do not pay interest on these 
deposits nor they charge fees for their services. Implicit forms of payments however 
usually exist, and it is not uncommon to find that money-keepers also perform lending 
functions8• 
Informal Financial Groups 
There is a large diversity of informal financial groups operating in rural and urban 
areas of African countries. Savings associations, savings and credit associations (rotating 
or non-rotating) and credit associations have been identified in several recent studies9• 
Savings associations are based on regular contributions of fixed or variable 
amounts from members to the group's fund. This fund is either kept by the treasurer 
at home, deposited in a savings account, lent as "emergency" fund, or a combination of 
these. At the end of a given period, the group members receive their savings back. 
Interest revenues, accrued from the group's savings account or from loans granted out 
of the "emergency" fund might be allocated to the members or recycled into the 
emergency fund or the savings account. 
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Savings and credit associations work like savings associations and, in addition, the 
group's savings fund is also used to allocate loans to members and eventually to non-
members. An emergency fund might complement the savings fund. All debtors of the 
emergency fund have to pay interest on their loans. Debtors of the main savings fund 
might or might not have to pay interest. Money that is not lent out, is kept by the 
treasurer at home and/or deposited in a savings account. 
In contrast to the savings association, in which a time period of operation is 
specified, the participants in a credit association (money-lending group) agree to subscribe 
variable amounts of money for an unspecified time period. Normally, the group par-
ticipants subscribe once at the foundation of the group or at their entry, however, 
individual members might subscribe additional funds to their group share. A money len-
ding group uses its fund exclusively for short term loans to non-members. Interest on 
these loans is usually higher than that charged by other lenders and is collected in 
advance. 
A very common form of financial group is the rotating savings and credit associa-
tion (ROSCA), known as "tontine" in many African countries or otherwise designated 
with a local (native language) term. Participants in these rotating associations make 
regular contributions to a fund which is allocated to each contributor in rotation. 
ROSCAs may or may not charge interest on the primary fund taken out by the members, 
and may or may not allocate part of the funds to a reserve for emergency loans to the 
participants. 
There is an explicit tie between loans and deposits in rotating savings an credit 
associations. Also, collateral and information problems are minimal since the members 
enrolled are only people who have mutual confidence in each other. The existence of 
both economic and social sanctions for defaulters in the group makes loan default 
unlikely. The case studies in Cameroon and Niger provide further details on the 
functioning of tontines. 
ROSCAs show many of the strengths associated with informal finance, they reduce 
transaction costs, they perform true intermediation through pooling savings and length-
ening the term structure of borrowed funds for ROSCA members, and they reduce risk 
through the use of appropriate incentives. The typical ROSCA operational formula is 
flexible and adjusts easily to diverse members' priorities and changes in the environment. 
J.D. Von Pischke (World Bank) considers this type of association a real "benchmark" ... , 
"a starting point for strategic thinking about financial services for the poor and a test for 
implementation plans"10• 
Are Informal Lenders Exploitative? 
The common criticism that informal lenders take undue advantage of borrowers 
was also challenged (although not empirically) in the Washington Seminar. First, the 
discussion above makes it clear that this criticism would apply only to a particular class 
of informal intermediaries, the moneylender. Therefore, even if proof of borrower 
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exploitation were presented, it should not negate the numerous advantages that other 
forms of informal financial intermediation offer. 
Moneylenders allegedly charge exorbitant interest rates, exercise monopoly power 
in their market areas and exploit borrowers through linking lending with unfair 
commodity transactions. Challenging these allegations, Professor Adams cited research 
documenting the high opportunity cost of funds and high risk associated with money-
lenders' transactions. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that moneylenders could 
exercise significant monopoly power for an extended period of time, given the absence 
of barriers to entry and the large diversity of forms of informal finance. Finally, 
borrower exploitation associated with loans linked with marketing of farm products may 
be better explained, Adams argues, by distortions in the commodity markets rather than 
by monopolistic power of the merchant in the loan market. 
To close the case against moneylender exploitation, Adams contends that, instead 
of stereotyping informal lenders as evil, "it may be more useful to think of them meta-
phorically as hospitals. Many of the patients (borrowers) who go there are physically 
(financially) stressed." ... " As a result of their visit, some of these patients are cured and 
never return to the hospital. The health of others is improved by their visit, but some 
of them must return periodically for additional treatments (loans) to sustain their well-
being. A few patients may perish (default) after coming to the hospital because their 
illnesses were too far advanced, they had afflictions that could not be treated by medicine 
(loans), or they refused to follow prudent health practices (were inefficient or unlucky 
managers)." 
Hospitals (i.e., moneylenders), the metaphor continues, "are the most expensive 
form of medical treatment (charge the highest interest rates) because they mostly handle 
patients who are seriously ill (have the lowest credit ratings)." ... "Blaming moneylenders 
for the financial difficulties encountered by a few of their borrowers is as illogical as 
condemning hospitals because they treat people who are ill and because some of their 
patients pass away." {Adams, p. 11). 
Informal Savings Mobilization 
In contrast with the usual emphasis on the credit side of informal finance, a 
number of presentations at the Seminar focused on the active and extensive savings 
activities taking place in informal financial markets. References were made to examples 
from Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Somalia and Zimbabwe, among other countries 
(see list of papers presented at the seminar in the Appendix). 
Informal groups are a major vehicle for savings mobilization. Indeed, the amounts 
of funds mobilized through these groups may be as large as those intermediated by the 
banking system (Cameroon). The widespread use of money-keepers documented in 
several countries (Gambia, Niger)'1 also highlights the dynamic substitution of informal 
finance for ineffective formal financial intermediaries. 
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An important feature of informal finance is the active participation of women, 
primarily in group activities. Evidence from Latin America and Africa (Cameroon, 
Somalia) indicated the relative disadvantages of women in gaining access to formal fi-
nancial markets and their active recourse to non-institutional forms of savings and credit. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Informal Finance 
Before presenting some selected case studies reported at the Seminar, it is useful 
to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of informal finance. Flexibility of procedures 
and practices, convenience, low information costs and good repayment performance are 
some of the best known advantages of informal finance. Information advantages through 
direct knowledge of the participants in informal transactions reduces transaction costs. 
In these markets, collateral substitutes such as marketing or labor arrangements, or 
different forms of reciprocity substitute for the lack of physical assets that would 
represent acceptable collateral for institutional lenders12• 
The ties between borrowing and savings inherent in many forms of informal 
finance help establish mutual trust and develop creditworthiness among participants in 
the market. A shortcoming of informal finance, however, is that it is usually unable to 
provide long-term loans even to creditworthy borrowers. Also, savings kept with informal 
intermediaries (individuals or groups) tend to be less liquid and less secure than those 
held at formal institutions. Furthermore, the .,informality" of informal intermediaries 
constrains their ability to establish links with formal intermediaries. This limitation and 
the relative small scale of informal intermediaries introduces difficulties in the manage-
ment of their portfolios, thus making them vulnerable to seasonal fluctuations in the 
availability of funds they intermediate. 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
Cameroon13 
This study documents and analyzes the activity of rotating and non-rotating 
informal financial groups in Cameroon, based on a field survey carried out in the Fall 
of 198814• The findings highlight the active participation of rural people in informal 
groups and the dominant role informal finance plays in funds circulation in this country. 
Several questionnaires provided information on the internal decision making 
process, control of group conduct, funds management, selection of beneficiaries, mecha-
nisms of social control, the importance of women as group members, and the relative 
importance of financial self-help groups (SHGs) in the community. A total of 136 
members and 14 group leaders were interviewed. 
It was found that the degree of financial intermediation and monetization in 
informal groups increases from the most simple type of ROSCA (those with an interest 
. ' 
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free rotating fund and no other financial intermediation) to the ROSCA type where the 
rotating fund is auctioned and the NonROSCA that operates an emergency fund and a 
mutual aid fund. However, all group types (with the exception of a money lending 
group) share several features in common: 
(a) All groups are self-selecting regarding their membership. New members must pass 
a period of regular savings before they are eligible for loans. 
(b) All groups keep records regarding loans, interest and deposits. 
(c) Meeting proceedings follow a specific pattern. Most meetings start with a prayer. 
Afterwards the secretary registers all attending members by collecting their 
identification cards and recording their names. 
( d) The members give their contributions to the treasurer who counts the money and 
reports the amount loudly to the secretary. The same procedure is used for loan 
payments due. Members who wish to obtain a group loan must publicly state 
this in front of the group. 
( e) Group participants who arrive late to a meeting, disturb the meeting, or cannot 
pay their contribution are charged fines. Observed fines for late arrivals and 
contributions were as high as an ordinary contribution or even twice as much. 
The accumulated fines might be used for food, entertainment, pooled together with 
the emergency or mutual aid fund, or disbursed at the end of the group's cycle. 
(f) In addition to the financial sanctions mentioned above, there are social sanctions 
that apply to the defaulters. Defaulters lose their reputation in the community 
and might never again be accepted in any other informal financial institution, 
therefore, defaults are rare. 
Main Features of Informal Financial Groups 
Common Bond and Membership: A majority of the groups interviewed had been 
founded by indigenous members of the community. Mutual trust and place of residence 
were most often reported as the common bond of the financial SHGs (50 percent of the 
groups), whereas ethnic group and gender appeared to play a less important role as a 
membership condition than was commonly assumed (21 percent and 14 percent of the 
groups respectively). 
Women in Cameroon are traditionally food crop producers who sell their surplus 
in local markets. Due to the recent financial crises in Cameroon and the relatively low 
prices for cash crops - the traditional domain of the men - the financial standing of 
farm-women is presently better than that of male small holders. Thus, farm women seem 
to be more active in financial SHGs than their husbands due to their more substantial 
and steadier flow of cash income. 
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Deposits and Contributions: The most common meeting frequency was monthly. 
Other common frequencies were weekly, bi-weekly or every three weeks. Members' 
contribution are normally paid at every meeting, however, in special cases, the members' 
contributions are paid at once at the foundation of the group or when a new member 
enters the association. Thirty-six percent of the interviewees reported receiving interest 
revenues for their deposits, although many of them could not specify the interest rate 
since the rate is generally calculated at the end of the cycle. The average return on 
savings was about 50 percent with a range from 12 percent to 60 percent per annum for 
the respondents who specified an interest rate on their savings. 
Six informal financial groups reported sources of funds other than the members' 
contributions. These other sources were a public development institution (FONADER), 
the Liywontse Association, an umbrella organization of 24 informal financial groups in 
the Nkar area (North-West Province), and a credit union. 
Uses of Group Funds: About three-fourths of all groups interviewed use their 
funds primarily for member loans. About 46 percent of these groups also hold reserves 
either at the treasurer's home and/or the bank or the credit union. One group, the 
money lending group, granted exclusively non-member loans, while another informal 
financial group invested its funds in a corn mill and accumulated savings in a nearby 
credit union. 
Relative Importance of Financial SHGs 
In this survey, almost 80 percent of all adult-family members participate in at least 
one financial SHG, about 52 percent of all interviewees belonged to multiple informal 
financial lending and savings associations. In one-third of the cases at least one other 
family member also participated either in the same group as the interviewee or in some 
other financial SHG. 
The mean value of informal loans in the sample was about 157 thousand FCF A 
per member. For purposes of extrapolation. it was assumed that only 70 percent of 
Cameroon's active population participates in informal financial groups. The active 
population was estimated at 3.5 million. With these assumptions, and using the average 
member loan from the sample data indicated above, it is possible to estimate the total 
amount of credit granted through informal groups in Cameroon at about 385 billion F 
CFA (157 thousand F CFA times 0.7 participation rate times 3.5 million active popula-
tion). This amount is equivalent to 36 percent of all claims on the private sector by 
Cameroon's commercial banks and its development bank in March 1988. This implies 
that these indigenous financial groups provide 27 percent of all loan requirements in 
Cameroon. 
A similar extrapolation for the amount of savings intermediated by informal 
financial groups gives an estimate of about 580 billion FCFA, an amount equivalent to 
1.2 times the magnitude of all demand, time, and savings deposits in Cameroon's 
commercial banks and its development bank in March 1988. This analysis thus indicates 
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that informal voluntary savings account for about 54 percent of total financial deposits 
in Cameroon. 
Two major remarks arise from this analysis. First, informal SHGs appear to be 
able to adjust their structure and operating principles to a wide variety of circumstances. 
These groups are capable of responding to widely different demands for financial ser-
vices, a major advantage with respect to formal financial institutions. 
The second major remark relates to the striking importance of informal groups in 
Cameroon's overall monetary circulation. The estimates reported in this paper suggest 
that informal groups account for more than one-fourth of total domestic private sector 
credit, and for more than one-half of total financial savings. These findings, for the most 
part consistent with previous studies on Cameroon, highlight the significance of informal 
finance in the country and emphasize the need to consider the likely effect on these 
groups of financial policy measures. For example, the current initiative of establishing 
a public agricultural bank in Cameroon should be evaluated in terms of the effects this 
institution might have on the motivations and incentives associated with the formation 
and functioning of informal financial groups. 
Niger15 
In 1985 and 1986 a team from Ohio State University surveyed a random sample 
of approximately 400 farm households in 22 villages in Niger and, subsequently, followed 
up with a field study of 38 wholesale and 58 retail merchants, 56 Tontine groups (i.e. 
ROSCAs in francophone Africa) and 39 active moneykeepers in these same villages. 
Results of these studies showed the importance of informal finance in the country and 
the channels through which this intermediation occurs. Each of these informal vehicles 
merits discussion in any consideration of finding an appropriate path of transition from 
informal to formal financial activity. 
Merchant Finance 
Wholesale merchants secured credit from urban based banks. In these transactions 
non-land collateral was highly associated with the amount and the term structure of the 
loans. These loans were then channeled to village retail merchants in the form of a 
consignment of consumer goods for which cash repayments were expected following the 
harvest. The retailers, in turn, sold the goods to villagers on credit. Following the 
harvest the chain of cash repayments worked itself back up through the layered infor-
mal network to the wholesale merchant and the bank. 
Several conclusions emerge from these financial practices of merchants. First, 
whether formally pledged or not, wholesalers with a large collateral base (usually inven-
tory holdings) clearly secured larger average sized loans and longer term loans from 
their urban based banks than those with a smaller collateral. Retailers, by the same 
token, also secured a larger consignment of goods (an implicit loan to be repaid later) 
for a longer period of time, the larger their collateral base. An indefinite term or open 
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lines of credit were evident between retailers and their village borrowers. These 
contracts comprised 40 percent of all retail transactions. Interest charges were admitted 
to by some but not by most wholesalers and retailers. This reticence to admit interest 
charges is not surprising in an Islamic society. It is likely that implicit interest was built 
into the prices of the consigned goods that were to be repaid by the villagers following 
harvest. The same implicit interest was likely for the cash repayment from retailer to 
wholesalers. These contract features could not be documented well in a short single 
visit interview. 
Ton tines 
The village level tontines represented a wide diversity of groups from housewives 
and farmers to market vendors; small businessmen, school teachers, and extension agents 
among others. For the most part these Francophone rotating savings and credit assoc-
iations had a common occupational bond though some limited crossing of groups and 
gender occurred. Membership size ranged from 4 to 40 individuals with the frequency 
of meetings and contributions and loans ranging from 5 days to one month and the 
lifecycle of a complete tontine round from one month to a year. Generally no payment 
was documented to move up in the queue for a loan. The sequential order to receive 
a loan was flexible with the group responding to special member problems and needs. 
An explicit treasurer operated in the higher income tontines, a post that generally 
received some form of remuneration or a privileged position in the sequential order of 
loans. Tontine leaders reported various problems with delinquent members, such as 
members migrating after receiving their loan or, at the other extreme, falling into a 
destitute situation. Finally it was not at all uncommon for members to be in more than 
one tontine at the same time. 
Two findings stand out from this research on the 56 tontine groups in the 22 
villages. First there was a remarkably wide income or wealth differential implicit in the 
average member contribution and average sized loan per tontine. Member contributions 
each round ranged from a low of 25 cents (in equivalent FCFA currency) in the lowest 
income tontine to a high of 70 dollars in the highest income group. Average tontine 
loans ranged from two dollars to 700 dollars in these villages. The average tontine loan 
size for all 56 tontines was equivalent to 111 dollars, almost twice the $65 dollar rural 
per capita income figure for Niger in 1985. The lower income tontines were composed 
of housewives and farmers who met frequently (every week) and had a short life cycle 
before being renewed with a small number of members. The high income tontines were 
associated with market vendors, businessmen, teachers and extension agents who met less 
frequently and operated for longer periods of time. 
The second major finding underscores the lar~e volume of liquidity that moved 
through these groups. The aggregate total for the contributions for the entire life cycle 
of all 56 tontines (i.e. the period of time that allows each member access to a tontine 
loan) amounted to $72,000 dollars. This highlights the ample base of local savings 
available for financial intermediation in rural Niger. These findings caught the attention 
of policymakers and donors alike_. However, the existence of a promising potential for 
rural savings mobilization is one thing, the appropriate or feasible mechanism that could 
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transform these informal savings into a more efficient formal form of financial inter-
mediation is another thing. 
Moneykeepers 
Moneykeepers round out this discussion of indigenous financial vehicles in rural 
Niger. Males predominate in this profession. Merchants are the most commonly chosen 
persons to undertake these activities. Moneykeepers offer multiple services to their clien-
tele. Not only do they hold deposits (for which they pay no interest) but some also offer 
pawnbroker and general storage services, especially for textile inventories. Finally some 
act as purchasing agents on their trips to Nigeria, bringing back goods for their villager 
clientele. Finally, moneykeepers also engage in loan activities with an average loan size 
of 144 dollars. The term structure on loans was generally shorter than those on depo-
sits suggesting an appropriate rudimentary matching of term structure between assets and 
liabilities. 
The deposit services cover a wide range of customers. Some moneykeepers have 
only a handful of deposit accounts. Others handle as many as 150 depositors. The total 
volume of deposits varied from a low of 30 dollars (in equivalent FCFA) to a high of 
13,000 dollars. As in the case of tontines the aggregate level of deposit activity for these 
39 moneykeepers was substantial. The volume of deposits for all 39 ranged from $34,000 
dollars during the dry season to $79,000 dollars in the immediate post harvest season. 
Thus there was a sharp seasonal variation, but in the end, a significant flow of funds 
circulated through these informal channels. · 
Lessons 
The implications derived from the above findings for these various channels of 
informal finance are several. First, the scope and magnitudes of informal finance are 
significant. The scope was wide, the magnitudes impressive. Second, despite the 
rudimentary nature of some of these activities, an embryonic form of financial inter-
mediation was clearly occurring within these informal intermediaries. Third, the organ-
ization of these activities were rational and business-like. For the most part these 
mechanisms are generally self-sustaining even in the face of the risky Sahelian environ-
ment that causes a delinquent clientele from time to time. 
The major lessons for formal finance are that any viable financial intermediary at 
the village level must be prepared to offer the financial services demanded by villagers. 
This demand emphasizes deposit and savings services, short-term and open lines of credit 
and non-production loans. Also the operational type of organization is marked by 
constant contact and frequently changing terms and conditions of loan contracts which 
in effect transform short- to longer-term loans. Multiple services are widespread with not 
only deposits and loans but in some cases pawnbroking, inventory, and marketing services 
built into some of these lenders activities. The implication is clear, credit alone is not 
the usual focus for local financial intermediaries. Yet it is this focus that predominates 
in all formal attempts to reach villages with formal finance in Niger. Thus it is not 
surprising to note widespread failure in these attempts. 
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LESSONS FROM INFORMAL FINANCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
"Informal finance persists and often flourishes because it resolves important 
problems that are handled poorly or not at all by most formal financial systems" (Adams, 
p. 11 ). Informal financial arrangements are diverse and flexible, i.e., they provide the 
mix of services demanded by the users of these services. Informal finance educates 
borrowers and lenders in sound financial practices, thus developing creditworthiness 
before credit actually takes place. Informal finance emphasizes voluntary savings instead 
of relying upon government or donor funds. Informal finance adjust procedures and 
introduce innovations to reduce transaction costs 
Formal financial systems and policy makers have some things to learn from 
informal financial transactions. As indicated above, however, informal finance has also 
limitations which cannot be ignored. Informal arrangements do not function well for 
large amounts of funds, do not supply long-term loans and have difficulties operating over 
long distances16• The policy implications derived from the Washington Seminar pointed 
towards preserving the advantages of informal systems while cautiously attempting to 
address the shortcomings of informal intermediation. Some key propositions are the 
following: 
Policies should attempt to enhance the performance of informal finance rather 
than trying to regulate it or replace it. 
The effects on informal financial markets of general financial policies should be 
considered and evaluated, to avoid unintended effects on these markets. 
The massive infusion of external funds into the informal financial system is likely 
to undermine the basic foundations of its success. Hence, use of informal financial 
intermediaries as "conduits" of donor funds should be gauged very carefully against 
the possible damage to the roots of the system these linkages can entail. 
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